Trouble is rearing its head again in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. That this occurs after a long period of peace in the area, particularly the usually untouched areas in Jammu, is cause not just for alarm, but also for some hard thinking about practical solutions for India. It’s not just that Assembly elections are due, but the Chinese border is also volatile. As Rawalpindi well knows, that puts India in a rather difficult position.
Situation on the ground
The data available needs to be seen in perspective.
First, while the army generally considers this period infiltration season, given that passes will soon close for winter, the facts indicate that infiltration has occurred in multiple areas, including across the international border through Punjab and Nepal. In other words, it’s multi-pronged. Infiltration through Nepal has been observed before, but not through Punjab. This likely means another network is active.
Second, this buildup has been happening for some time. Recall that two officers and a police officer were killed in Anantnag in September of last year, and that incidents have escalated since then.
Third, there is the now-accepted theory that these infiltrators are “irregulars,” meaning individuals well-versed in combat and possibly accompanied by a regular Pakistan army component, either retired or serving. This is evident from their strategy of striking security forces, retreating, and then reemerging elsewhere to strike again, not to mention the abundance of seized weapons, including US and Austrian assault rifles. Their arsenal suggests a well-stocked inventory.
Fourth, areas in Jammu are, for the first time in recent years, witnessing local support. This implies significant financial backing and the exploitation of local discontent. In summary, this is an organised military operation, characterised by excellent intelligence and a commitment to a protracted campaign.
The Indian Army knows its stuff
Given these realities, simply calling for better intelligence gathering is ineffective. The problem is that it requires significantly more manpower, and a lot of it. In simple terms, the ‘AOR’ (area of responsibility) of each unit expands when there is a drawdown, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the surveillance and intelligence grid.
In theory, the use of drones could reduce the need for large troop numbers, but these areas are heavily forested, rendering drones virtually useless. Technical intelligence gathering, particularly ‘listening’ capabilities, has also become problematic. Terrorists are increasingly using Ultra Sets, which importantly bypass mobile towers.
Traditionally, counterterrorism efforts have relied on tracking which mobile towers become active, indicating potential infiltration routes and groups. The Ultra Sets circumvent this system by communicating directly with a control station across the border via Chinese satellites and a master server in Pakistan. These sets, incidentally of Chinese origin and custom-made for the Pakistan Army, add another layer of complexity. It’s worth noting that troops were moved out of ‘quiet areas’ in the two Union Territories to man the Line of Actual Control with China. While this is not definitive proof of collusion, it presents a serious issue that needs addressing. This situation is a significant concern that the army must consider as it repositions and redeploys its forces.
What to do (and ‘proactive’ is not enough)
Given the grim reality that India has faced this situation for over a decade, the question arises: is it time for decisive action? Should India consider a cross-border raid, utilising land, air, or combined forces? While comparing casualties is tragic—each life is precious—some perspective is necessary. Comparing present figures to 2005 is misleading. That year saw a drastic reduction in terrorism-related deaths, with 15 security force personnel killed compared to upwards of 300 annually in previous years. However, casualties have now risen back to similar levels, although civilian casualties have halved.
Given this reality, how should India proceed? The most apparent option is to withdraw from the Ceasefire Agreement negotiated in February 2021. However, recall that this was done after the abrogation of Article 370, and after the Galwan clash. At that time, Pakistan’s army chief, General Bajwa, agreed to the ceasefire and, crucially, upheld it— despite the fact that there were some 600 firing incidents just before the agreement. In other words, the Pakistan Army decided to play ball at a time when Pakistan was facing the worst ever terrorist situation that began that year, coinciding with India’s confrontation in Galwan. Significantly, the Pakistan Army honoured the agreement for nearly three years.
However, the current Army Chief, General Asim Munir, appears to have adopted a different stance. This shift in policy may stem from his focus on a new operation, “Azm e Istekham,” in parts of the tribal areas. While General Bajwa might have sought an “understanding” with India, General Munir seems to believe that India will exploit the army’s preoccupation with this operation. Given the pre-election rhetoric here, he may have his reasons.
The Balakot option
Another option is a Balakot-style airstrike. This tactic was employed in response to one of the worst terrorist attacks on Indian security forces, which resulted in the deaths of 40 personnel. It was claimed by the Jaish-e-Mohammed, and thereafter India retaliated by attacking a (long known) camp of Jaish. That Pakistan would retaliate was expected, but it caused no significant damage, opting instead to target uninhabited areas. In short, Pakistan chose not to escalate, and neither did India.
In subsequent years, India threatened Pakistan with missile strikes, communicating this message through the US, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. While Pakistan would likely have retaliated, the threat ultimately led to the release of a captured Indian pilot. Given that the current aggression bears the clear hallmark of the Pakistan army—evidenced by a recent attack involving a Border Action Team (BAT) alongside terrorists—a targeted strike on a Pakistani military camp could be considered. However, it must be clearly understood that Islamabad will almost certainly retaliate, as it must to ensure its survival. As in previous instances, this intention would need to be communicated to the US and other relevant actors. While such actions are technically illegal under international law, India possesses the inherent right to self-defence under those same laws.
Another, less drastic option involves utilising Special Forces for cross-border operations. However, the critical question remains: will any of these actions achieve India’s ultimate objective—peace along the Line of Control (LoC)? While they might provide temporary respite, the possibility of another Galwan-like confrontation remains a significant concern.
Munir’s musings?
The key is to understand why Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Munir has chosen this course of action. His decisions so far suggest a high tolerance for risk and a complete indifference to casualties among his own people. It is a fact that he has the backing of China, as evidenced by the frequent visits of Pakistani army contingents to Beijing and other locations. It is also well-established that Pakistan is financially dependent on China. While it is possible that China is exerting pressure on Pakistan to keep India ‘engaged,’ there is one reservation: Pakistan has not yet fully committed to this approach. The country values its limited resources too highly.
A second possibility is that Pakistan aims to disrupt the upcoming Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir. While Islamabad allowed general elections to proceed smoothly, local elections, potentially viewed as an endorsement of Article 370’s abrogation, are a different matter. While India could counter with robust psychological operations (psyops), operational successes are crucial to inspiring confidence. A population witnessing attacks on their own soldiers is less likely to participate in elections.
A third possibility is that COAS Munir genuinely believes India is acting deceptively in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Accusations of Indian backing for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have been growing, even as casualties among the Pakistani Army surge. Pointing out that Pakistan created the TTP from its own resources is futile. The only solution is to initiate discreet talks with the Pakistani Army, facilitated by an institution connected to the Indian Army. Regardless of what the bureaucrats think, these are institutions that speak the same language. It’s worth trying. Although the Indian Army does not have the same decision-making power that the Pakistani Army enjoys, (or is saddled with), it is the army that is fighting this battle and it’s the army therefore that needs to know the truth, however ugly.
The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. She tweets @kartha_tara. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.
Comments
0 comment