The visit of President Putin to Beijing on February 4 and that of Prime Minister Imran Khan from February 3 to 7 for the Winter Olympics in the context of the deepening of Russia-China ties and Pakistan’s reliance on China to sustain its hostility towards India that serves their mutual interests have implications for us. China’s rise as the second most powerful country today, with major advances in military technologies whose transfers to Pakistan can impact us, and this coupled with our deteriorating relations with China, adds to our strategic challenges.
These developments relating to our security are taking place when the geopolitical landscape is becoming more complex. India’s ties with the US have become increasingly close since the 2005 nuclear deal, with the sharp deterioration of its ties with China providing even more momentum. However, with the US debacle in Afghanistan, more inward looking policies, political polarisation at home, disowning of globalisation that it once promoted as the centrepiece of its economic thinking, the palpable strains in the trans-Atlantic alliance, the challenges to US power led by China and Russia will increase.
The US is treating both Russia and China as adversaries and is embroiled militarily at both end of the Eurasian continent, which is manifestly stretching its resources. The US remains a very powerful actor in international affairs but does not have the same pivotal position as before, with the rise of China and the eastward dispersal of political and economic power.
The US now has diminishing influence in Pakistan which already in China’s orbit can derive benefit from the intensifying China-Russia ties. Russia has already been making overtures to Pakistan, even in the military domain. It is seeking to revive the economic presence it had in Pakistan in the past. Russia also seeks to insulate itself and Central Asia from the fall-out of developments in Afghanistan with a takeover of the country sooner than expected by the Taliban. Just as the US has sought Pakistan’s assistance in managing the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, Russia too has engaged Pakistan with the same aim. Pakistan is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and this provides another platform for Russia-Pakistan engagement. We should watch for the results of the announced visit of Imran Khan to Russia this month.
Has Russia Conceded Far Too Much?
Russia is drawing closer to China to counter pressures from the US and Europe, on the political, military and economic fronts. The US and Europe are threatening Russia with draconian sanctions, financial and on the gas front (North Stream 2), on top of earlier ones should it invade Ukraine. This is strengthening Russia’s Eurasian tilt. Its economic ties with China are expanding, with bilateral trade reaching the $140 billion mark. Russia’s trade with the EU currently stands at €174.3 billion, which is not significantly higher. At the Beijing summit, Putin has flagged $200 billion as a target for Russia-China trade for which a road map was agreed to, apart from a contract to supply 10 billion cubic metres of natural gas every year to China from its Far East, as well as crude for oil refineries in western China.
Russia’s strong support for the BRI comes out in the joint statement which speaks of linking the development plans of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Belt and Road Initiative (which India strongly opposes) and intensifying the practical cooperation between the EAEU and China in various areas and promoting greater interconnectedness between the Asia Pacific and the Eurasian regions as part of a Greater Eurasian Partnership.
Five paragraphs are devoted in the joint statement to the views of the two countries on democracy, showing how much they have been put on the defensive by the West on accusations of authoritarianism against them. Russia has conceded far too much to China on democracy and human rights issues in self-defence.
Russia is far more democratic than China; it has political parties, elections, dissent, access to the internet and international social media; it is not suppressing its Muslim population or other ethnic groups, and so on. And yet, in the joint statement it joins China in defining democracy the way China does — a process-driven democracy. What are China’s “long-standing traditions of democracy” that the statement claims is not clear.
Similarly, the statement makes the issue of human rights relative, to be seen through the “prism of the real situation in every particular country”, and that “human rights should be protected in accordance with the specific situation in each country and the needs of its population” (amounts to an indirect justification of China’s treatment of Uighurs and Tibetans).
Russia’s vulnerability and the need to rely on China to counter the US has made it concede to China’s evasive position that the origin of coronavirus should be a matter of science, with the work carried out jointly by China and WHO to identify the source of the infection welcomed. Russia has supported the China-WHO joint report on the matter. Russia has suffered immensely from the pandemic and should have interest in a proper investigation that China has obstructed.
The give and take on other issues of great sensitivity on both sides is apparent. Russia has supported the One-China principle, confirmed that Taiwan is an alienable part of China, and opposed any form of independence of Taiwan. China, in return, has opposed further enlargement of NATO and called on it to abandon its cold war approaches and respect the sovereignty, security and interests of other countries. It has supported also the proposals put forward by Russia to create long-term legally binding security guarantees in Europe.
Interestingly, the Russian sides “notes” the significance of Xi’s concept of constructing a “community of common destiny for mankind” (whatever that means), and in return, China “notes” the significance of the efforts of Russia to establish a just multipolar system of international relations (does this suggest China doesn’t believe in multipolarity, only in G2)?
Imran Khan’s Lacklustre Visit
Without mentioning the Quad by name, both countries have opposed “the formation of closed bloc structures and opposing camps in the Asia-Pacific region” and intend to remain “highly vigilant about the negative impact of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy”. Both countries have expressed strong concern about AUKUS and condemned the nuclear proliferation risks this pact on nuclear propelled submarines carries. They oppose “bullying” (what about China’s bullying in South China Sea and against Australia, and Lithuania?), unilateral sanctions (on which the US is terribly guilty but China is too) and extraterritorial application of jurisdiction (legitimately).
Of interest to India in particular is the support for deepened strategic partnership within BRICS in the three areas of politics and security, economy and finance and humanitarian exchanges, with efforts to further strengthen the BRICS Plus/Outreach format with regional integration associations and states with emerging markets. More interestingly, Russia and China intend to develop cooperation within the Russia-India-China dialogue, and this finds mention despite the current military standoff in Ladakh.
In comparison, the Imran Khan visit produced lacklustre results, though the rhetorical flourishes about “iron brotherhood” and Pakistan-China All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership being time-tested and “timeless” (Really? When Pakistan did not exist before 1947) abounded. Imran met both Chinese PM Li Keqiang and President Xi Jinping during his visit.
Imran willingly kowtowed to Xi and China, lauding the role of CPC leadership with President Xi Jinping at its core and expressing Pakistan’s commitment to “One-China Policy and support for China on Taiwan, South China Sea, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet”. Surprisingly, China in return was muted in reaffirming its “support for Pakistan in safeguarding its sovereignty, independence and security”. While both countries agreed to continue the momentum in defence cooperation, nothing new was announced during the visit. No announcement of fresh loans to Pakistan seem to have been made either though a number of agreements and MOUs were signed.
The two sides expressed their “strong determination to safeguard CPEC from all threats and negative propaganda, with Pakistan reaffirming its commitment to making all-out efforts for the security of all Chinese personnel, projects and institutions in Pakistan”. That Islamic Pakistan, which disowns its Indian heritage in favour of an Arab and now a Turkish one, will organise a Gandhara Art Exhibition in Beijing in 2022 is interesting, all the more so as the CPC wants to officially suppress Buddhism.
Disregarding India’s long-standing concerns, China, as usual, gave a good chit to Pakistan on terrorism, recognising its sacrifices and efforts in the fight against terrorism. Indirectly referring to India-Pakistan differences, the importance of pursuit of dialogue and resolution of all outstanding disputes to promote regional cooperation gets a mention in the joint statement.
Imran, as we know, is in a crusader mode on Kashmir. He, as the joint statement notes, used the occasion to brief the Chinese side on the latest developments in the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. The formulation on the Chinese side does not go beyond what it has been saying earlier. China has reiterated that the Kashmir issue was a dispute left from history, which should be properly and peacefully resolved based on the UN Charter, relevant Security Council resolutions and bilateral agreements. China also said it opposes any unilateral actions that complicate the situation. China may have felt it prudent to publicly not go beyond its existing position at this stage.
The two sides expressed their readiness to discuss with Afghanistan the extension of CPEC to it.
India’s Task Cut Out
With the UN still unreformed, the Security Council blocked, China’s influence in the UN system growing, key parts of the global arms control structure breaking down, the world trading system fracturing with the structural erosion of the WTO, and the emergence of new technologies that see a competitive race between China and the US for dominating them, the instability in international system is growing. To this is added the economic and social devastation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the opportunities this has opened up for a reshuffling of equations between rival powers.
India has to address these challenges like others, though for us they are more acute in some respects. The rise of China affects us more directly as we are contiguous, our borders are unsettled, Pakistan is being constantly boosted by it as a strategic threat to us, it is penetrating our neighbourhood, its maritime strategy threatens our interests. As we are the only credible challenger to Chinese hegemonic ambitions in Asia being pursued by President Xi Jinping, we have to monitor and hedge against them. We have our work cut out in a difficult environment.
Kanwal Sibal is the former Indian Foreign Secretary. He was India’s Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the stand of this publication.
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