Cable 09MOSCOW1111, FM LAVROV DISCUSSES MISSILE DEFENSE AND IRAN WITH
Reference ID: 09MOSCOW1111
Date: 2009-04-29 13:01
Classification: SECRET
Origin: Embassy Moscow
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 001111
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KACT IR RS
SUBJECT: FM LAVROV DISCUSSES MISSILE DEFENSE AND IRAN WITH
CODEL LEVIN
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary. Foreign Minister Lavrov told visiting Codel
Levin April 15 that arms control issues were Russia's top
priority. Noting that Moscow was waiting for concrete
proposals, including specific language, from the U.S. on a
post-START treaty agreement, Lavrov said he recognized that
the U.S. would not want to address the link between offensive
and defensive weapons in the post-START negotiations, but it
would be important to have such a dialogue in the future.
Russia was interested in developing a joint missile defense
system (MD) with the U.S., but we should start "from
scratch," with joint threat assessments, determination of
necessary resources, and best location for MD assets. Lavrov
rejected a quid pro quo in which the U.S. would discontinue
its MD plans for eastern Europe in exchange for Russia
pressuring Iran to end its nuclear weapons program,
emphasizing that each issue should be considered separately.
He acknowledged that Moscow was concerned about Iran's
longer-range missile development and said Russia would be
prepared to undertake a "dual-track" approach towards Iran's
nuclear program; offering incentives to Tehran, but keeping
in reserve measures within the Agreed Framework. He
reconfirmed that Moscow had suspended the sale of S-300's to
Iran "for the moment." In a follow-on meeting, DFM Sergey
Ryabkov stressed that while Russia was interested in working
with the U.S. on MD, it would be difficult for Russia to join
a U.S. MD effort that included sites in Poland and the Czech
Republic, and urged that if the U.S. intended to pursue sites
in Europe, they should be further west and south, so as to
diminish the effect on Russian capabilities. Ryabkov
emphasized that "no one can deliver Iran to the U.S., except
the U.S. itself," and argued that, while the S-300 sale was
"frozen," the "less Moscow heard from Washington about it,
the better." End summary.
¶2. (C) In a meeting with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in
Moscow April 15, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Carl Levin (D-MI), together with SASC members Bill
Nelson (D-FL) and Susan Collins (R-ME) emphasized that they
were united in their hope that the U.S. and Russia could
strengthen their cooperation to address common challenges.
Noting the Senate's Constitutional role in ratifying treaties
and providing advice and recommendations on foreign policy
issues to the President, Senator Levin raised missile defense
(MD) as an issue that had divided the two countries, but
should unite them. He suggested that if Russia and the U.S,
could work together on MD, it would send a powerful message
to those who might threaten us, including to Iran.
¶3. (C) FM Lavrov welcomed the Senators' visit, and noted that
it was timely, coming two weeks after the first meeting
between Presidents Obama and Medvedev. He highlighted the
important role "Parliaments" play in building constructive
relationships and expressed the hope that the U.S. and Russia
could overcome the "inertia" that had characterized the
relationship in the past.
Arms Control, NPT
-----------------
¶4. (C) Lavrov said that arms control issues were Russia's top
priority. The U.S.-Russia agenda was positive, even though
we had differences. Moscow hoped the U.S. Administration
would submit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for
ratification, and would reconsider sending the "123"
Agreement to the Hill. He welcomed President Obama's remarks
supporting nuclear weapons reductions, saying that such
reductions were not just a matter of security for the U.S.
and Russia, but carried a political message that would be
important for the 2010 review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). While characterizing the elimination of nuclear
weapons as "a noble goal," Lavrov said it was not "an
immediate project." We needed to have some clear proposals,
which would give others a clear idea of the way forward. He
suggested that the next stage after the post-START
negotiations should consider how to engage others, such as
the UK, in discussions of further reductions, as well as
looking at tactical nuclear weapons.
¶5. (C) There was "a lot to do" on non-proliferation issues,
Lavrov said, including Iran and North Korea. Pakistan was a
concern, and we should think about engaging them as well as
India and Israel. The U.S. and Russia had cooperated to
MOSCOW 00001111 002 OF 005
address the danger of non-state actors acquiring nuclear
material though programs such as the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism and UN Security Council Resolution
¶1540. The U.S. and Russia should also look at ways to
strengthen the NPT regime, including how to universalize the
Additional Protocol. We should also work on issues like fuel
supply, the Nuclear Fuel Center Russia had started, and
programs like the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.
Post-START
----------
¶6. (C) Lavrov expressed appreciation for the Senate's
confirmation of Rose Gottemoeller as A/S for VCI, noting that
the U.S. and Russia had a lot of work to do to achieve a
follow-on agreement to the START Treaty. The issue would be
discussed at the meeting between DVBR Director Anatoliy
Antonov and A/S Gottemoeller in Rome on April 24, as well as
in his meeting with the Secretary in Washington in May. The
teams would report to the Presidents in July, and hope to
reach a framework agreement by the end of the year. He said
that while the Presidents in their statement April 1 had
endorsed reductions below the Moscow Treaty limits and had
agreed to use many of the verification procedures of the
START Treaty, Moscow was waiting for more concrete proposals
from the U.S., including specific language.
¶7. (C) Lavrov highlighted the April 1 Joint Statement's
reference to the link between offensive and defensive
weapons, saying that the balance between the two that had
existed in the Soviet Union had been thrown off kilter when
the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty. He stressed that he
recognized this did not mean the U.S. would support
addressing the linkage during the post-START negotiations,
but it was important to have a discussion on it at some point
in the future.
Missile Defense and Iran
------------------------
¶8. (C) Senator Levin said the SASC was interested in
exploring the possibility of U.S. and Russia working together
on MD. The U.S. was focused on the threat from Iran, but he
recognized that Russia may have a broader perspective.
However, we were both opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran, which
would be able to put pressure on other countries in the
region. The U.S. also perceived the possibility of an
Iranian long-range missile as a threat. He noted that press
reports indicated that Medvedev had told Henry Kissinger and
the Hart-Hagel Commission that he was concerned that the
Iranian nuclear program was more of a threat than Russia had
previously believed. (Lavrov emphatically corrected this,
saying Medvedev had expressed concern about Iran's missile
launch). Noting that the U.S. had made commitments to Poland
and the Czech Republic, Senator Levin said the U.S. would
need to consider how to keep those commitments and include
Europe in a common MD program with Russia.
¶9. (C) Agreeing that MD should unite the U.S. and Russia,
rather than divide us, Lavrov said Russia was interested in
developing a MD system with the U.S., but the U.S. proposals
for an MD system in Poland and the Czech Republic ("3rd
Site"), disrupted the balance between the U.S. and Russia's
nuclear potential. He stressed that then-President Putin's
Kennebunkport proposal for a cooperative MD effort using
Russian resources, joint analyses and determinations of the
threat, and data exchange centers, was still on the table.
He welcomed President Obama's statement that if the Iran
nuclear issue were resolved satisfactorily, there would be
less need for the 3rd Site, but took care to emphasize that
Russia did not support a quid pro quo between Russia helping
to get Iran to end its nuclear weapons program and the U.S.
discontinuing its deployment in eastern Europe. These two
issues should be dealt with separately, on their own merits,
Lavrov stressed.
¶10. (C) Noting that the Congressional Budget Office had
presented three alternatives on the MD project, Lavrov said
this showed there were issues with the proposal. Hastening
to add that Russia did not endorse any of the three
alternatives, Lavrov commended the Administration's intent to
review them, noting this was the difference with the new
Administration: it was willing to listen and take the time to
analyze the alternatives, instead of saying "this is what
MOSCOW 00001111 003 OF 005
must be done; everyone must say yes sir."
¶11. (C) In response to Senator's Levin question why Russia
was not more concerned about Iran's missile capabilities,
since Russia was closer to Iran, Lavrov said Moscow was "not
complacent; we are closer." But whenever Russian negotiators
had protested to the U.S. side that the proposed radar could
cover Russia up to the Urals and the interceptors could reach
Russian territory, the U.S. response had simply been that the
system "was not aimed at Russia." As Medvedev and Putin had
said, "when there is something risky on the ground, you need
to take it into account." Russia had warned it would need to
take countermeasures if the 3rd site was deployed, and that
it would put missiles in Kaliningrad. Noting that Moscow
would announce soon just how much it had withdrawn from
Kaliningrad, Lavrov said he hoped the U.S. and Russia could
find common ground on MD.
¶12. (C) Lavrov cautioned that Russia did not perceive Iran in
the same way as the U.S. Iran for Russia was "much more than
a country which might cause concern in the international
community." Russia opposed Iran getting a nuclear weapon,
because Russia did not want any more "members of the nuclear
club," but Iran and Russia were historical and traditional
partners and neighbors, with a "rich bilateral agenda."
Lavrov said he was certain Iran wanted to have a full nuclear
fuel cycle and would negotiate from that basis. It was
unfortunate that the U.S. had not accepted the proposals a
few years before when Iran only had 32 centrifuges; now they
had over 5,000. Nonetheless, Russia wanted Iran to cooperate
fully with the IAEA and implement, and eventually ratify, the
Additional Protocol. As agreed to in the E3-plus-3
statement, Russia wanted Iran to prove the peaceful nature of
its nuclear program, in a verifiable way.
¶13. (C) Lavrov commended the new U.S. approach to Iran,
welcoming President Obama's readiness for the U.S. to engage
"fully" in talks with Iran. Willingness to discuss "all" the
issues was a welcome step, and one which Russia had been
advocating for several years, Lavrov said. Iran wielded a
lot of influence in the region, including on Afghanistan,
Iraq, Hizbollah, Hamas, Gaza, etc. Iran had long been
concerned about Israel, and saw Pakistan as a nuclear-weapons
competitor. Putin had asked Ahmadinejad during a meeting in
Tehran a few years before why he made such anti-Israeli
statements, but Ahmadinejad had not responded, only saying
that Iran was "not doing anything in the nuclear sphere
different from Brazil." Putin had replied that Brazil was
not in the Middle East. While Iran wanted to dominate the
region and the Islamic world, which was of concern to Arab
governments, the U.S. should realize that the "Arab Street"
considers Iranian leaders to be heroes.
¶14. (C) Noting that Russia was watching events in Iran
closely, Lavrov said Moscow would be prepared to undertake
the "dual-track approach," first offering incentives to Iran,
but keeping in reserve measures within the Agreed Framework.
The Administration's new approach "give us a much better
chance than we had in the past. We will do everything we can
to make it work," Lavrov said.
¶15. (C) Senator Nelson said he was encouraged by the FM's
remarks, noting that it might be possible to consider
cooperating on use of Russia's radars at Gabala and Armavir.
He said he hoped Lavrov was right that Iran would be deterred
from building a nuclear weapon, but he was skeptical. The
best deterrence might be for the U.S. and Russia to cooperate
on MD.
S-300 Sales
-----------
¶16. (S) Senator Levin said that Russia had taken a practical
and pragmatic step with the suspension of the sale of S-300
missiles to Iran, Senator Levin said. This helped make
Israel less nervous, and sent a message to Iran that the U.S.
and Russia were working more closely together on Iran issues.
Lavrov acknowledged that Russia was not supplying the system
"for the moment," but reiterated the usual mantra that
Russia's S-300 contract with Iran did not violate any
international or national laws or arms control regimes, and
that the S-300's were a defensive system only. He added that
nothing Russia had sold Iran had been used against anyone,
whereas U.S. weapons provided to Georgia had been used
MOSCOW 00001111 004 OF 005
against Russian soldiers. This did not mean the U.S. did not
have the right to sell weapons to Georgia, but Moscow did not
want a repeat of the August 2008 conflict. Overall, he said,
the Iranians had legitimate security concerns. They had been
attacked more than once by their neighbors, and saw
Pakistan's nuclear status as "competition for regional
leadership."
¶17. (S) In a follow-on meeting with DFM Ryabkov, Senator
Levin asked whether Iran believed the S-300 sale was canceled
or just suspended. Ryabkov replied that a contract existed,
and it was impossible to break a contract without
consequences. He repeated that Moscow had taken U.S. and
Israeli concerns into account, and at present Russia was not
providing any components of the system to Teheran. Thus, it
was "obvious the degree to which Iran was dissatisfied with
this," he said. But, the contract was not canceled, it was
merely "frozen," Ryabkov stressed. He argued that "the less
we hear from Washington about this, the better."
Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------------
¶18. (C) Senator Collins expressed appreciation for Russia's
allowing transit of non-lethal equipment to ISAF in
Afghanistan, and asked how the U.S. and Russia could work
together to counter terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Lavrov said Pakistan was a place were "a lot of problems
start for Afghanistan," and questioned the term "moderate
Taliban." He said the people on the UNSCR 1267 Committee
list should be "blacklisted for as long as possible," but for
anyone else, as long as they renounced terrorism, cooperated
with the Kabul government, and refrained from extremist
activity, it would be all right to deal with them.
Ryabkov Meeting
---------------
¶19. (C) In a follow-up meeting with DFM Ryabkov immediately
afterwards, Ryabkov cited the non-paper Lavrov had given the
Secretary in the Hague on March 31, and said there was
already a good basis to cooperate with the U.S. on MD.
Progress had been made in the NATO Russia Council on theater
missile defense, and Moscow believed there was more that
could be done there. But he reiterated Lavrov's position
that bilateral discussions would need to start from scratch.
He disagreed with Senator Levin's statement that the system
could not have a significant impact on Russia's nuclear
capabilities. He noted that Russia was more concerned about
the radar than the interceptor sites, because the former
could see the location of Russia's strategic forces, but even
with the interceptors, nobody could predict what would be at
those sites in 10 years' time. In response to Senator's
Levin's asking whether the deployments couldn't be limited by
an agreement, Ryabkov acknowledged that was a possibility,
but stressed that the radar could still be used with other
U.S. MD assets. The sites in Poland and the Czech Republic
were part of a global MD architecture, which, when linked
together, could almost "knock Russia out."
¶20. (C) Ryabkov stressed that while the U.S. and Russia were
not adversaries now, "intentions could change," whereas
"capabilities" were much harder to change. He noted that the
countries in eastern Europe saw the 3rd site as more of a
geo-political issue, bringing them closer to the West, than
as a response to a potential threat from Iran. "We are not
in a zero-sum game and we do not want to use your possibly
legitimate security concern as a geo-political pawn," Ryabkov
argued. Noting a link to the post-START negotiations,
Ryabkov said the greater the reductions in number of warheads
each side could possess, the more strategically important MD
became. He added that it would be politically difficult for
Russia to join a U.S. MD effort that included sites in Poland
and the Czech Republic. If the U.S. intended to pursue sites
in Europe, they should be further west and south, so as to
diminish the effect on Russian capabilities.
¶21. (C) In response to Senator Levin's question whether it
would be possible to develop a joint radar system with
Russian radars at Gabala, Armavir, and Moscow, connected to
U.S. AEGIS and THAAD systems, Ryabkov responded that he had
not considered such an idea before and would need to think
about it. Such a system, he noted, would become strategic,
and would lack the X-band capability of the radar proposed
MOSCOW 00001111 005 OF 005
for the Czech Republic, since all the systems cited were
early-warning radars only, but it could be an option.
¶22. (C) Ryabkov said Russia hoped it would be possible to
have a "meaningful dialogue" with Iran, and noted that
President Obama's remarks had had a strong impact in Teheran
and the Arab world. But it was still difficult to predict
how Teheran would react. He characterized the P5-plus 1
(E3-plus-3) statement as "very promising," but claimed
experience showed Iran would not make concessions under
pressure. He emphasized that it was "very clear that no one
can deliver Iran to the U.S., except the U.S. itself."
Civilian Space Cooperation
--------------------------
¶23. (C) In response to Senator Nelson's question about
prospects for increased civilian space cooperation and what
would happen when the U.S. was fully dependent on the Soyuz
spacecraft to reach the International Space Station, Ryabkov
said he saw no difficulty with meeting the U.S.'s needs, and
said we should both be forward-leaning. He noted that
RosCosmos had suggested to NASA that Russia cooperate on
development of the U.S.'s new spacecraft, but the idea had
not been pursued. Ryabkov proposed we discuss the issue
further with RosCosmos and said Moscow favored closer
cooperation with the U.S. and Europe in this area. While it
was not linked to MD, the more progress we could make on MD,
the better able we would be to move forward on other issues.
¶24. (U) Codel Levin did not clear this cable.
BEYRLE
Reproduced from cablegate.wikileaks.org
List of India-related documents from the first batch of 226 documents released by WikiLeaks
(India-specific portions highlighted in bold)
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